Two men once ran Australia’s largest outlaw motorcycle club together, side by side, at the very top of its command structure.
One survived a bounty on his life and 10 bullets to prove it.
The other beat him in a leadership contest for the national presidency, then spent the next several years insisting publicly that the bad blood between them was over.
According to a Daily Telegraph report, neither of them runs the club anymore.
Both have reportedly been stripped of their leadership positions entirely following what’s being described as a bitter, escalating power struggle that outlasted every public show of unity either man ever staged.
Their names are Alan Mi and Tar Zahed.
If you’ve watched this channel before, you already know parts of their story.
The triumvirate that once governed the Comancher from exile, the shooting that nearly killed one of them.
The murder charge that’s followed the other.
What we’re covering here is what’s reportedly happened since not just Mi and Zahed removed, but the club’s national vice president and national secretary reportedly stripped alongside them in what looks less like a leadership transition and more like an internal purge.
Before we go further, a note on how this video is put together.
The specific reporting on this latest leadership shakeup comes from a single Daily Telegraph story, and we haven’t been able to independently verify every detail of it beyond confirming the report itself exists and matches what’s being described.
Where we relying on that reporting rather than something we’ve cross-cheed ourselves, we’ll say so directly.
Everything else, the men’s backgrounds, the earlier leadership crisis, the club’s broader history is drawn from court records and independent reporting.
We have verified because here’s what makes this story worth taking seriously.
Even with that caveat, it fits a pattern this channel has now documented across more than a decade of Comancheto leadership.
Presidents don’t retire from this club.
They get arrested, shot, exiled, or apparently voted out by their own senior members, and someone always steps into the vacancy within days.
Days before this reported shakeup became public, New South Wales police arrested yet another alleged senior commoner figure at Sydney airport.
A man who’d been on the run since 2022.
The pressure on this organization hasn’t let up.
If anything, it’s part of why the organization keeps eating its own leadership.
In this video, we’ll go through what’s actually been reported about this latest leadership collapse, how it connects to everything that came before it, and what it says about an organization that’s now cycled through national leadership more times than this channel can easily count on one hand.
If you’re new here, this channel covers organized crime history across Australia and New Zealand using court records and verified public reporting.
No dramatizing, no glorifying.
Subscribe and turn on the bell if you want to see where this one goes.
We’ll start with the photograph that was supposed to prove the feud was over.
In 2016, when Commtoer National President Mark Battle fled to the United Arab Emirates rather than face a murder investigation, he didn’t hand power to a single successor.
He split it three ways, appointing a committee, National Sergeant-at-Arms Tarak Zahed, Melbourne Chapter President Mick Murray, and Sydney Chapter President Alan Mian.
For 6 years, that arrangement held the club together, at least on paper.
It came apart in 2022.
Murray was arrested for murder that April.
Weeks later, Zahed was shot 10 times in the foyer of an Auburn gym.
His younger brother, Omar, killed in the same attack.
Mian, the third member of the committee, won the resulting leadership contest, becoming national president while his two former colleagues dealt with a murder charge and a near fatal shooting, respectively.
Mi’s own background sits at some distance from the traditional image of a bikey boss.
Born in 1987 into a poor family of Irish descent.
Raised on a Sydney public housing estate, he joined the Rebels at 18, rose to president of that club’s Krenella chapter, then defected to the Common Chero, becoming a protetéé of Battle himself.
His path to formal leadership ran through violence more than once.
In 2020, he became president of the Common Cherro’s Cambra chapter, specifically because the previous holder of that position had been murdered.
Zahed’s own record, independent of anything connected to the 2022 shooting, is extensive.
Convicted of assault as a teenager in the 1990s, convicted again in 2001 after setting his own dogs on a woman during a road rage incident, convicted in 2004 after fracturing a man’s skull in a drug deal gone wrong.
Convicted of attempted murder in 2011 after shooting someone directly.
He built a reputation and a media nickname, the Balenciaga bikey, sometimes the Gucci gangster, around a taste for expensive clothing that sat alongside a documented history of serious violence.
In 2020, he was convicted of living off the proceeds of crime after investigators found money in bank accounts registered in his own children’s names.
In January 2021, security cameras caught him assaulting a rival in a restaurant bathroom in Bangaroo.
What connected these two men beyond their share position on Ble’s original committee was a rivalry that never fully resolved even after Mian won the formal contest between them in August 2022.
Months after the gym shooting, man posted a photograph of himself with Zahed to Instagram using the nickname hard to kill and a caption about love and brotherhood.
A post widely read according to reporting on the period as a direct attempt to rebut rumors that Mian himself had been behind the attack on his former rival.
Whatever the truth of that suspicion, the gesture suggested two men trying, at least publicly, to present a united front rather than an open rivalry.
That same month, Sahed was charged with an entirely separate murder, the 2014 killing of Ysef Assum, a case that had nothing directly to do with the events of 2022.
But that meant Zahed was managing his own recovery from near fatal gunshot wounds alongside a serious unresolved criminal charge.
He was arrested in a dramatic operation in Edgliffe.
Police shooting out the windows of his car after he refused to exit.
By 2023, Mian’s own position had proven considerably less secure than the formal title suggested.
He was convicted that year of breaching a serious crimerevention order.
After relocating to Queensland, a move his own lawyer told a court was for Mian’s safety.
Given a reported multi-million dollar bounty, police had specifically warned him about.
He avoided further jail time, but the conviction and the relocation behind it made clear that holding the common cherro’s top position hadn’t brought me in anything resembling security.
This is the position both men occupied heading into the years that followed formally at the top of Australia’s largest outlaw motorcycle club or close to it.
While each separately managed serious ongoing legal jeopardy and while the underlying rivalry between them, whatever its true depth, never fully disappeared from the public record.
It’s against this backdrop that the most recent reported chapter of their story needs to be understood.
To understand why a reported leadership purge involving Meian and Zahed wouldn’t be surprising, it helps to look at how unstable the positions both men held had already proven to be well before any of the specific events covered in this account’s most recent chapter.
Start with the broad organization both men were nominally leading.
The common chair’s international structure, the supreme commander role sitting above the national presidency had already cycled through multiple leaders in the years surrounding Mian and Zahed’s own rise.
Dwax Nakuru held that title before fleeing to Turkey in 2011, evading arrest there for over a decade before finally being detained in January 2023.
Mark Ble held it after him, fleeing to the UAE in 2016, eventually extradited back to Australia in August 2022 to face drug smuggling charges of his own.
By the time Meian reportedly rose to claim some version of that same international title, described in some 2026 reporting as world president, he was stepping into a role that had already proven fatal or ruinous to both of his immediate predecessors.
The national presidency beneath that international role had its own separate history of instability.
McMurray held it as acting president from 2016 following Bull’s exile before his own arrest for murder in April 2022 ended his tenure.
Mian’s rise to replace him wasn’t a clean uncontested transition.
It came directly out of a leadership contest against Zahed, one serious enough that its outcome arguably contributed to the attempt on Zahed’s life weeks later.
Whether or not Miun himself had any connection to that attack, a suspicion this account has already noted, he felt compelled to publicly deny.
It’s worth adding a detail this account hasn’t yet covered in full.
Some reporting from March 2023 indicates Mian may have already been removed from the national presidency once before, replaced at that point by a Melbourne-based figure named Bamir Serichevich, described in reporting as a painter and a close friend of Mian’s own.
If accurate, this would mean the position changed hands, or at least appeared to, within less than a year of Mian first winning it, reshuffled quietly enough, or described inconsistently enough across different reporting, that this channel has had genuine difficulty establishing a fully consistent timeline of exactly who held the formal national presidency at any single point between 2022 and today.
That inconsistency is itself worth taking as evidence of something an organization whose leadership structure has become so fluid, so frequently contested that even journalists and researchers dedicated to tracking it struggled to produce a single agreed account of who’s actually in charge from one year to the next.
Zahed’s own position, meanwhile, never fully stabilized after the 2022 shooting.
Losing his sight in one eye, managing a separate murder charge connected to a killing eight years earlier, he remained a senior figure within the organization’s structure, reportedly still holding the National Sergeant-at-Arms role, the position responsible for enforcing internal discipline without ever again mounting a serious successful challenge for the top job itself.
According to reporting connected to the most recent leadership shakeup, it was precisely this dynamic that eventually broke down.
Zahed allegedly working to elevate his own position and influence within the club’s hierarchy, creating exactly the kind of internal division a healthier, more secure organization might have been able to absorb without a full leadership collapse.
There’s a pattern worth naming plainly here because this channel has now documented it across multiple separate Comanche leadership crises spanning more than a decade.
Every time this club’s formal leadership structure has been tested by arrest, by exile, by violence, or apparently by internal political maneuvering of the kind now being reported around Zahed specifically, the response has been broadly similar.
A scramble for position among the club’s remaining senior figures playing out largely outside public view until reporting eventually catches up with what’s actually happened.
Battle’s own response to the 2017 Fishwick brawl, installing Alibabazi via a mass text message rather than trusting his own official threeperson committee to handle the crisis established this pattern early.
Nothing about the club’s subsequent history suggests that underlying dynamic has ever genuinely resolved.
It’s also worth considering what police themselves have said about where actual authority within the Comanche currently sits because it complicates any simple narrative about Mi or Zahed personally controlling the organization from the top down.
According to reporting connected to the most recent leadership changes, investigators believe genuine power within the club continues to rest substantially with senior figures currently in custody.
Men able to direct the organization’s affairs from behind bars, taking advantage of considerably greater access to smuggled mobile phones and correctional facilities outside New South Wales than prisoners typically have within the state’s own prison system.
Specifically, if accurate, this suggests the formal titles this account has spent considerable time tracing, national president, national sergeant-at-arms, world president may matter less in practical terms than the club’s own internal politics would suggest.
Real authority on this account doesn’t necessarily follow the title at all.
It follows whichever senior figures still have reliable access to a phone regardless of which state’s prison system happens to be holding them or whether they’re formally free at all.
This is worth connecting to something this channel has documented in its coverage of Basam Hamsy’s own decades long history of directing brothers for life from inside some of Australia’s most secure correctional facilities.
The specific mechanism differs.
Hamsy built and led his own organization from custody continuously rather than exercising influence over a formal structure he’d once held a title within.
But the underlying pattern is strikingly similar.
Prison walls, even the country’s most secure ones, have repeatedly proven less absolute, a barrier to continued criminal authority than their design would suggest.
If police are correct that commoner leadership currently flows through imprisoned senior figures with reliable phone access rather than through mi Zahed or whoever formally holds the national presidency at any given moment, then this entire account’s careful tracing of formal titles and leadership contests may be documenting something closer to a surface level power struggle playing out over positions that carry real prestige and real legal risk, but that don’t necessarily correspond to where the club’s actual functional decision-making authority resides.
That’s a genuinely uncomfortable possibility to sit with because it means everything this account has traced the triumvirate.
The 2022 collapse, man’s rise, the suspicion he was behind Zahed’s shooting, the reported 2026 purge could represent an elaborate highstakes contest for authority that from the perspective of the people actually directing the organization’s criminal activity matters less than this account’s detailed attention to it might suggest.
Whether that’s actually the case or whether police assessment of where real power sits is itself only a partial imperfect picture of a genuinely complex organization isn’t something this account can resolve with confidence.
What it can say is that the specific claim imprisoned leaders in other states retaining greater practical authority than free leaders in New South Wales fits a broader pattern this channel has now documented repeatedly across multiple different organized crime networks in Australia.
And it’s worth taking seriously rather than dismissing as incidental to the more visible, more dramatic leadership struggle this account has spent most of its length tracing.
What happened next, according to the most recent reporting available, is where this account turns.
According to a Daily Telegraph report, the leadership shakeup that removed both Alan Mi and Tar Zahed from their senior positions followed months of escalating tension between the two men.
Tension the hard tokill photograph from August 2022 had at the time appeared to resolve, but that reporting now suggests never actually went away.
The specific account given in that reporting described Zahed as the party actively working to shift the balance of power in his own favor, seeking to elevate his position within the club’s internal hierarchy in a way that created genuine visible division among the organization’s senior membership.
It’s worth being precise about what this account can and can’t confirm regarding that specific characterization.
This channel has been able to independently verify that the Daily Telegraph report exists and that its headline matches exactly what’s being described here.
Common Cherro chiefs Mihan and Zahed reportedly ousted amid a bitter power struggle.
What this account hasn’t been able to do is access the full text of that report directly given it sits behind a subscription payw wall.
Meaning, the more granular details of how the internal dispute actually unfolded and what specific actions or alliances tipped the balance toward removing both men rest on secondhand description of that reporting rather than this channel’s own direct verification of the primary source.
With that caveat clearly stated, here’s what’s being reported as the internal dispute between Mian and Zahed intensified.
Other influential figures within the Comancher’s senior membership are said to have intervened directly, removing both men from their leadership positions.
This wasn’t reportedly limited to the two figures whose rivalry had defined so much of this account’s earlier coverage.
National Vice President Cain Jones and National Secretary WDE hopes are also reported to have been stripped of their positions as part of what’s being described as a broader restructuring of the club’s entire senior leadership team.
It’s worth pausing on the scale of what’s being described here because it’s considerably more significant than a simple resolution to the Mihan Zahed rivalry specifically.
If accurate, this represents four separate senior office holders, national president or world president, national sergeant-at-arms, national vice president, and national secretary removed from their positions in a single reported action.
That’s not a leadership transition.
That’s closer to what this account’s hook described at the outset.
Something closer to an internal purge, sweeping out a significant portion of the commoner’s entire formal command structure at once.
Rather than resolving a single contested rivalry between two individuals, this account doesn’t have independently verified information about who specifically replaced any of these four men, or about the exact internal mechanics of formal vote, a negotiated settlement among remaining senior figures, or something closer to a forced removal that produced this outcome.
What can be said, drawing on everything this account has already traced about the commoner’s broader leadership history, is that this pattern of sudden comprehensive leadership turnover isn’t new to this organization.
It’s simply the latest and by some measures the most sweeping version of a pattern this channel has now documented repeatedly.
Formal commoner leadership structures proving consistently unable to survive contact with internal rivalry, external police pressure, or some combination of both for more than a few years at a time.
There’s a specific detail worth returning to from the broader reporting on this period because it adds useful context to how seriously the risks facing both Mian and Zahed personally should be understood regardless of their formal titles.
Both men have, according to reporting, previously been warned directly by New South Wales police that active contracts existed on their lives.
Not simply rumor or underworld speculation, but formal warnings delivered by law enforcement to men they’d assessed as facing genuine credible threats to their physical safety.
It’s worth holding this detail alongside the reported leadership purge because it suggests the stakes involved in this internal power struggle were never purely political or reputational.
Whatever combination of internal maneuvering actually removed both men from their positions.
It took place against a backdrop where each of them had already been told by the very police force investigating their organization that people wanted them dead.
This account has already documented in detail exactly how real that specific danger proved to be for Zahed personally.
The 10 bullets, the death of his own brother, the permanent loss of sight in one eye.
Whether Meian has faced anything approaching that same level of direct physical danger himself isn’t something this account can confirm with the same certainty.
Though his own relocation to Queensland in 2023, explained by his lawyer specifically in terms of a credible multi-million dollar threat against his life, suggests his position was never as secure as his formal title might have implied either.
It’s worth reflecting on what a reported restructuring of this scale actually means for an organization this channel has already documented cycling through leadership repeatedly over more than a decade.
Police, according to the same broader reporting this account has already referenced, describe the current outlaw motorcycle club landscape in Australia as highly volatile with allegiances constantly shifting between competing factions.
Not a description specific to the common cherro alone, but one this channel has now seen borne out repeatedly in its own documentation of this specific club’s internal history.
Loyalty within an organization like this one, according to that same reporting, continues to shift as different groups compete for influence over the club’s future direction.
A genuinely fluid and stable foundation for any organization to build lasting authority on, regardless of how firmly any individual leader might believe they’ve secured their own position at any given moment.
There’s a final point worth making about what this reported purge suggests for the two men most directly affected by it.
Mian and Zahed each spent years by this account’s own detailed tracing building and defending senior positions within an organization that has now according to reporting removed both of them essentially simultaneously.
Neither man’s removal based on available reporting appears to have come through arrest, extradition or death.
The three mechanisms this account has most commonly documented ending commoner leadership tenures across its broader history.
Instead, both men were apparently removed through the club’s own internal political process.
Whatever that process actually looked like in practice, it’s worth considering what that specifically implies.
An organization demonstrating through this reported action that it retains some genuine internal capacity to remove even its most senior most visible figures without needing external law enforcement intervention to do it.
A different and in some ways more genuinely institutional form of accountability than the arrests and shootings that have defined most of this account’s earlier coverage of commoneral leadership turnover.
Whether that internal capacity reflects a genuinely functioning organizational structure capable of self-correction when its own senior figures become too much of a liability or simply the same underlying volatility this account is documented throughout.
Expressing itself this time through political maneuvering rather than violence is a question this account can’t resolve with the evidence currently available.
What it can say with the confidence this channel applies consistently across every case it covers is that both explanations remain genuinely possible and that neither one changes the basic now wellestablished pattern.
Nobody who has held senior commoner leadership across the period this account has documented has managed to hold it indefinitely.
Days before this reported leadership shakeup became public, a considerably less senior but genuinely revealing story played out at Sydney International Airport.
One worth including in this account because of what it demonstrates about the sustained ongoing scale of police pressure the entire Comanche organization has continued facing regardless of whatever internal political changes were simultaneously unfolding at its very top.
At around 8:00 on the morning of Friday, 24th July 2026, detectives from New South Wales Police’s State Crime Command Raptor Squad, assisted by Australian Border Force officers, arrested a 37year-old man named Daniel Tatuni as he arrived at Sydney International Airport.
He’d reportedly been identified through Australia’s border screening systems the moment he landed, prompting border force officers to alert police, who deployed state crime command detectives directly to the airport to take him into custody without incident.
Totuni had been wanted on outstanding arrest warrants since 2022, close to 4 years.
Based on available reporting, those warrants related to allegations of large commercial drug supply, directing a criminal group, organizing or conducting a drug premises, and dealing with the proceeds of crime.
According to police, he’d allegedly been living in the Middle East for a significant portion of that period, evading Australian authorities in a manner this account has now documented in different specific forms across multiple separate figures connected to the commoner’s broader leadership and membership.
It’s worth pausing on Tatuni’s own specific position within the organization because police were notably precise about how they characterized it.
Detective Superintendent Katsufus told media that police would allege Tatuni had once held a high position within the common cherro, but was no longer a formal member of the club.
A distinction worth taking seriously given how much of this account’s broader coverage has focused specifically on currently serving formerly titled leadership figures.
Tatuni represents something slightly different.
A man whose alleged criminal activity connects directly to the organization’s history, but whose formal standing within it had apparently already lapsed by the time police finally caught up with him.
Investigators indicated they remain interested in at least one further figure connected to the same drug operation, a second unidentified man believed to be somewhere in the Middle East still at large.
It’s worth noting this detail specifically because it illustrates something this account has already traced in its coverage of Seed Aka’s own case.
The Middle East alongside Turkey specifically has functioned repeatedly as a genuine extended refuge for Australian organized crime figures facing serious domestic charges regardless of whatever formal extradition arrangements technically exist between Australia and the specific countries involved.
According to reporting on Tatuni’s underlying case, a 2018 search of a unit in Randwick, Sydney, connected to the broader investigation had recovered 1 kg of cocaine, close to $95,000 in cash, two machine pistols, and three semi-automatic pistols along with a substantial quantity of drug paraphernalia.
It’s worth including this specific detail because it grounds the more abstract large commercial drug supply language of Totuni’s formal charges in something more concrete.
A genuinely significant weapons cache discovered years before his eventual arrest, suggesting the underlying operation he’s alleged to have directed was considerably more serious and more heavily armed than a routine drug supply case might typically involve.
The investigation that finally caught up with Taunji operated under a specifically named police task force strike force Var established by state crime commands raptor squad with the explicit purpose of targeting the commoner’s broader criminal activities as an organization rather than pursuing individual charges against isolated members.
It’s worth situating this alongside the other dedicated task forces this account has already documented across its broader coverage of commonro leadership crisis.
Strike Force Liry established specifically to investigate the 2022 shooting of Zahed.
The various operations connected to operation ironside’s broader reach into commoner linked figures like the lawyer Ted Dobson.
Taken together, these represent a genuinely sustained multi-year, multi- agency law enforcement commitment to disrupting this specific organization, considerably more extensive than any single arrest or single leadership crisis this account has documented in isolation.
It’s worth reflecting on the timing of Tatuni’s arrest, specifically set against the reported leadership purge covered in the previous part of this account.
A senior figure absent from Australia for close to four years was finally caught and returned to face serious charges in the same general period that the club’s remaining currently active leadership was reportedly undergoing its own significant internal upheaval.
This account can’t establish a direct causal connection between these two events.
There’s no evidence to Tunji’s arrest was connected to or triggered by whatever internal dispute led to Mian and Zahed’s reported removal.
But the coincidence of timing is worth noting regardless because it illustrates something about the specific environment the Kancherto organization has been operating inside throughout this entire period.
Sustained ongoing external pressure from multiple separately resourced police operations arriving simultaneously with whatever internal political instability was independently unfolding at the club’s own senior level.
This is worth connecting to the broader observation this account raised in its previous part regarding police assessment of where genuine common authority actually sits.
If investigators are correct, that real power within the organization increasingly flows through senior figures in custody, taking advantage of greater phone access outside New South Wales, specifically then arrests like tois removing a formerly senior figure who’d already left the club’s formal structure, operating from overseas for years before finally being caught, represent a different and in some ways less structurally significant kind of disruption than police might have hoped for a decade ago when this organization was more commonly described in Australian media as the country’s single most powerful outlaw motorcycle club.
The specific individuals keep changing.
Some get arrested at airports after years abroad.
Others get shot in gym foyers.
Still others, according to the most recent reporting, get quietly stripped of formal titles through the club’s own internal processes.
What hasn’t changed across everything this account has now documented spanning well over a decade is the organization’s continued capacity to keep functioning regardless, cycling through leadership, absorbing losses at every level from rank and file associates through to its most senior internationally recognized figures and apparently continuing to generate enough criminal activity to keep multiple separately resourced police task forces occupied simultaneously.
Whether the reported 2026 leadership purge represents a genuine turning point for this organization, a moment where sustained internal instability finally produces a more lasting, more coherent leadership structure, or simply the latest entry in a pattern this account has now traced across more than 15 years of commonro history isn’t something this account or any single piece of reporting currently available can answer with confidence.
It’s worth stepping back at this point in the account to actually count what this channel has now documented across its full coverage of commonro leadership specifically because the raw number is worth sitting with directly rather than simply implying.
Duak Nakuru held the club’s most senior international role before fleeing to Turkey in 2011.
Mark Buddle succeeded him before his own flight to the UAE in 2016.
Butler’s committee structure.
Murray, Zahed, and Mihan together governed for six years before collapsing in 2022.
Mi emerged from that collapse as national president, reportedly losing that specific title to Bamir Sarrachovich within less than a year, according to some 2026 reporting, while apparently claiming some version of the international world president title for himself around the same broader period.
And now, according to the most recent reporting this account has covered, Mihan and Zahed have both reportedly been removed from whatever positions they still held alongside National Vice President Cain Jones and National Secretary Wade Hopes.
That’s at minimum six distinct individuals this account has now traced holding some version of senior kanchero national or international leadership across roughly 15 years.
And that count doesn’t include Alibazi.
Installed temporarily via mass text message during the 2017 Fishwick crisis or Hassan Topal who separately served as acting national president during an earlier period when Murray was in custody.
Realistically, this account has now documented somewhere between 8 and 10 distinct people occupying some form of senior national Kerto leadership since 2011.
An organization that across the same period has continued operating, recruiting, and generating enough serious criminal activity to justify multiple dedicated police task forces working simultaneously.
It’s worth asking directly what this pattern actually says about the nature of leadership within an organization like this one, because it cuts against a common assumption about how criminal organizations typically function.
The conventional image of a crime boss, a single powerful figure commanding genuine, durable authority over an organization for years or decades, simply doesn’t match what this account has documented about the commoner specifically across the entire period this channel has researched.
What actually seems to happen based on everything traced here is closer to a continuous churn.
Formal titles changing hands with genuine regularity driven by arrest, exile, violence, internal political maneuvering, or some combination of all four.
While the underlying organization itself persists largely undisturbed by any single individual’s rise or fall, there’s a comparison worth drawing to this channel’s broader coverage of Australian and New Zealand organized crime more generally.
This account has documented the rebels own leadership instability through Alex Vela’s exile and Damian’s contested presidency.
It’s documented brothers for life surviving Basam Hamzy’s continued direction from custody alongside Farhad Kami’s own rise and downfall as Blacktown chapter leader.
Every major organization this channel has covered in detail shows some version of this same underlying pattern.
Individual leaders proving considerably less durable than the organizations they briefly led.
The Comancherto specific version of this pattern, as this account has now traced it in detail, may simply be the starkkest example this channel has yet documented.
An organization that cycled through senior leadership at a pace that makes even a dedicated careful attempt to track it, like this one, struggle to keep a fully consistent agreed account of who’s actually in charge at any given moment.
What this suggests ultimately is that questions like who runs the commoner may simply be less stable and less answerable with lasting confidence than they initially appear.
This account can tell you with real confidence who’s held various senior titles at various points across the past 15 years and what happened to end each of their tenures.
What it can’t tell you with the same confidence is who holds genuine lasting authority within this organization today or whether whoever currently holds the formal titles Mian and Zahed reportedly just lost will still hold them by the time anyone including this channel gets around to checking again.
There’s a specific structural question worth asking directly having now traced the commoner’s leadership history in this much detail.
Why does an organization this consistently unstable at its very top continue functioning at all, let alone continue operating as one of Australia’s largest and most closely monitored outlaw motorcycle clubs?
Part of the answer lies in something this channel has documented repeatedly across its broader coverage of organized crime in Australia and New Zealand.
These organizations were never actually built around the durability of any single leader.
However much their internal culture and their public reputation might suggest otherwise.
What sustains an organization like the commenter isn’t Alan Mian or Tex ahead or Mark Battle or any of the other names this account has traced holding formal titles across the past 15 years.
It’s the underlying infrastructure those individuals briefly direct established drug supply chains.
Existing chapter structures spread across multiple states and according to this channel’s own earlier research extending into countries including Turkey, existing relationships with international criminal networks, and a recruitment pipeline that appears to continue functioning regardless of whatever chaos is unfolding at the organization’s most senior level at any given moment.
It’s worth connecting this specific observation to the police assessment this account has already raised twice now that genuine authority within the club may currently flow through senior figures in custody rather than through whoever formerly holds the national presidency or world president title on paper.
If that assessment is accurate, it suggests something worth taking seriously about how resilient this kind of organization actually is against the specific law enforcement strategy this channel has documented Australian police pursuing consistently across more than a decade targeting formal leadership positions specifically through tools like serious crimerevention orders, sustained surveillance, and dedicated strike forces aimed at whoever holds the top job at any given moment.
If the people actually directing criminal activity are the ones in prison cells with reliable phone access rather than the free men holding public titles, then a law enforcement strategy built primarily around disrupting formal leadership may be targeting the wrong layer of the organization entirely or more precisely targeting a layer that matters considerably less than its visibility and its formal prestige would suggest.
This raises a genuinely difficult question about what actually would disrupt an organization like this one in a lasting way if targeting its formal public-f facing leadership hasn’t managed to do so across 15 years of sustained effort.
This account doesn’t have a confident answer to that question.
And it’s worth being honest about that rather than manufacturing false certainty.
What can be said is that the specific pattern this channel has now documented arrests, exiles, shootings, and now apparently an internal purge, none of which has produced anything resembling a stable, lasting resolution to the common cherro’s leadership question, suggests the current combination of strategies, however individually well-resourced and wellexecuted each specific operation has been, hasn’t yet found the approach that actually works.
There’s a further reflection worth offering here connected to something this account raised earlier regarding the difficulty of even establishing a consistent agreed record of commoner leadership at any given point.
This channel prides itself across every account it produces on working from court records and verified public reporting rather than speculation.
The common chair’s own leadership history, as this account has now traced it in detail, has repeatedly tested the limits of what that standard can actually deliver.
Wikipedia’s own account of Mian’s tenure contains genuine internal inconsistency, describing him as continuously holding the national presidency since 2022 while separately naming a successor who apparently took that same title within less than a year.
This account’s own research into the most recent reported purge rests substantially on a single paywalled news report this channel could confirm exists, but couldn’t independently verify in full detail.
Even the club’s own internal politics, according to reporting on the pattern of shifting allegiances between competing factions, appear to change faster than any external account, however careful, can consistently track.
This isn’t a failure of this channel’s research specifically.
It’s worth naming as a genuine structural feature of trying to document an organization this deliberately opaque, this consistently unstable and this actively hostile to the kind of outside scrutiny a channel like this one is built around providing.
Every figure this account has traced, Buttle, Gakuru, Murray, Zahed, Mian, and now apparently Jones and Hopes as well, has had a genuine interest in obscuring exactly the kind of clear verified record this channel tries to build.
Some of that obscuring happens through geography, fleeing to countries with limited practical extradition cooperation.
Some of it happens through the club’s own internal culture of silence toward police and by extension toward journalists and researchers working from public reporting rather than direct access to the organization’s own internal decision-making.
What this account can offer, having worked through everything currently available, is the clearest picture this channel has been able to construct of a genuinely difficult subject to document with full confidence.
An organization that has cycled through senior national and international leadership at least eight or nine times across roughly 15 years through a combination of arrest, exile, violence, and internal political upheaval without any of those transitions producing a leadership structure that’s proven capable of lasting more than a few years before the next crisis arrives.
Whether the most recent reported purge, Mi, Zahed, Jones, and Hopes, all reportedly removed together, represents a genuine break from that pattern, finally producing something more stable, or simply the next entry in a cycle this account has now documented in exhaustive detail, isn’t something the evidence currently available allows this channel to answer with confidence.
What can be said with the same confidence this channel applies across every account it produces is this.
Whoever holds the common cherro’s formal leadership titles by the time anyone actually checks again the organization itself will almost certainly still be there functioning largely as it always has regardless of whatever combination of names happens to be attached to its most senior positions at that particular moment.
This account set out to trace what’s reportedly happened to Alan Mian and TK Zed.
Most recently, a reported purge that according to available reporting removed not just the two men whose rivalry has defined much of this channel’s coverage of the common cherro’s recent history, but the club’s national vice president and national secretary alongside them.
It’s worth closing by being honest about exactly how much of that story this account can actually stand behind with full confidence and how much remains necessarily more provisional.
What this account can confirm independently Mi and Zahed’s shared rise through Mark Butler’s original leadership committee, the catastrophic collapse of that committee across 2022, taking Murray, nearly taking Zahed’s life, and eventually producing Mi’s own contested rise to the national presidency.
The genuine documented suspicion that Mi may have been connected to the attack on his own rival.
A suspicion serious enough that his own public gesture of solidarity towards Zahed months later reads in retrospect as a targeted attempt to address it directly.
Mian’s own 2023 conviction for breaching a serious crimerevention order and his relocation to Queensland for what his own lawyer described as genuine safety concerns and independently and robustly verified the arrest of Daniel Tutunji at Sydney airport in July 2026, closing out close to 4 years as a wanted man.
Evidence alongside everything else this account has traced that sustained police pressure on this organization hasn’t let up.
Regardless of whatever internal political changes were simultaneously unfolding at its senior level, what this account can’t confirm with the same confidence the full specific details of the reported purge itself.
This channel has verified that a real Daily Telegraph report exists, matching exactly the headline this account opened with.
Comanche chiefs Mi and Zahed ousted amid a bitter power struggle.
It has not been able to independently verify every specific claim connected to that reporting, including the precise mechanics of how Cain Jones and Wade Hopes came to be removed alongside the two more prominent figures, or exactly which senior Comancher figures orchestrated the reported removals.
This account has chosen consistently with the standard it applies to every case it covers to be direct about that distinction rather than presenting secondhand reporting with more confidence than this channel’s own verification process can actually support.
There’s a broader reflection worth closing on.
One that connects this specific unfolding story to everything this channel has now documented across its coverage of the Kancherto specifically and organized crime in Australia and New Zealand more broadly.
This account has traced an organization that has now cycled through senior leadership more times than most viewers could easily list from memory.
Men who rose through genuine ambition, genuine violence, and in at least one case, genuine institutional patronage from an exiled predecessor, only to find that whatever authority came with their formal title proved considerably less durable than the positions prestige might have suggested.
Some were arrested, some were shot.
Some, according to the most recent available reporting, were apparently simply voted out by their own colleagues in a process this account genuinely cannot see clearly enough to describe with full confidence.
What remains consistent across every version of this story this channel has now told is the organization itself persisting, recruiting, generating enough sustained criminal activity to justify strike force after strike force, task force after task force, arrest after arrest, leadership crisis after leadership crisis, without any single one of those disruptions producing the kind of lasting resolution that would actually end this account’s need to keep returning to this same organization’s story.
This channel doesn’t know who holds genuine authority within the commonro today in the most complete sense of that question.
Neither based on the genuine inconsistency this account has encountered across its own research does Wikipedia or several of the news outlets this channel has drawn on throughout its coverage.
What can be said with real confidence is that whoever it currently is, they’re occupying a position that has proven fatal, ruinous, or simply temporary for every single person who’s held it before them across more than 15 years.
And there’s no evidence currently available suggesting that pattern is about to change.
This channel covers organized crime history across Australia and New Zealand using court records and verified public reporting rather than speculation, including, as this account has tried to demonstrate throughout, being direct about where that verification currently runs out.
If you’re new here, that’s the standard we hold to on every case.
Subscribe and turn on the bell if you want to see where this one and the commoner’s next leadership crisis, whenever it inevitably arrives, actually goes.
Is.
